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In this work, we develop a formal model of the AFDX frame management to ascertain the reliability
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of timed automata and use UPPAAL to model-check for the desired properties expressed in CTL. Our
analysis indicates that the design of the AFDX frame management is vulnerable to faults such as network
babbling which can trigger unwarranted system resets. We show that these problems can be alleviated by
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suggest communicating redundant copies of the reset message to achieve tolerance to network babbling.
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Abstract

a subset of the profiled version of IEEE 802.3 standard Ethernet [9], with key enhancements to provide deterministic
timing and reliable delivery of messages. Deterministic timing is achieved through communication over virtual links
(VL) that have a bounded bandwidth and frame delivery interval. Communication over redundant channels is used to
achieve reliable delivery of the messages. A frame management mechanism is responsible for checking integrity of
message frames and managing the redundancy before delivering the messages to the application. Therefore, the frame
management forms an important component of the AFDX
design and has to be guaranteed against design flaws.
In this work, we develop a formal model of the AFDX
frame management, analyze and verify whether it meets the
requirement specification under different kinds of network
faults. In developing a formal model of the frame management, we use timed automata [1] that can quantitatively
capture the temporal information. Our specific model consists of a network of timed automata with a transmitting
end system, two communication channels and a receiving
end system. The system is described in UPPAAL [5] which
supports model-checking properties specified in CTL. From
our analysis, the design was found to be vulnerable to faults
like network babble which led to unwarranted resets and
dropped frames if they arrived out-of-order. To fully utilize the redundancy in messages and use this redundancy to
detect faults, we propose including a priority queue at the
receiver. This will help detect network babble on a channel, and deliver frames in sequence to the application even
if they arrive out-of-order. To reduce the probability of erroneous resets, we suggest communicating redundant copies
of the reset message. These modifications can easily be incorporated into the original design and provide increased
reliability to the AFDX frame management.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-

The Avionics Full Duplex Switched Ethernet (AFDX)
has been developed to provide reliable data exchange with
strong data transmission time guarantees in internal communication of the aircraft. The AFDX design is based on the
principle of a switched network with physically redundant
links to support availability and be tolerant to transmission
and link failures in the network.
In this work, we develop a formal model of the AFDX
frame management to ascertain the reliability properties
of the design. To capture the precise temporal semantics,
we model the system as a network of timed automata and
use U PPAAL to model-check for the desired properties expressed in CTL. Our analysis indicates that the design of
the AFDX frame management is vulnerable to faults such
as network babbling which can trigger unwarranted system
resets. We show that these problems can be alleviated by
modifying the original design to include a priority queue at
the receiver for storing the frames. We also suggest communicating redundant copies of the reset message to achieve
tolerance to network babbling.

1 Introduction
Control systems in general and avionics systems in particular, rely on complete and up to date data delivered from
the source to receiver in a timely fashion. For safetycritical systems, reliable real-time communication links are
essential. The Avionics Full Duplex Switched Ethernet
(AFDX) [3], has been developed to meet these requirements for commercial aircraft applications. The AFDX is
∗ This research was supported in part by NSF CCR-0209024 and ARO
DAAD19-01-1-0473.
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tion 3 introduces the AFDX and the frame management,
Section 4 describes the timed automata model of the system, Section 5 presents the analysis and results. Finally,
we present the modifications in Section 6 and conclude in
Section 7.
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Figure 1. Network Redundancy Concept

2 Previous Work
source end-system to potentially multiple destination endsystems through which data frames are exchanged. The data
flow on the links is controlled by the end-system in accordance with a Bandwidth Allocation GAP(BAG). The BAG
values are time slices allocated by and end-system to transmit data for a VL. These times are defined in milliseconds
and are typically powers of two.s
Reliable frame delivery in the AFDX design is ensured
by utilizing redundant links. This basic idea of network redundancy is shown in Figure 3. End-systems communicate
over multiple communication channels with the effect that
communication is protected against loss of one complete
network.
The redundancy scheme operates on a per link basis in
the following manner: A transmitting end-system prepares
some data and passes it to the communications protocol
stack. Here, a sequence number field is added to each frame
to enable the receive function to reconstruct a single ordered
stream of frames without duplication before delivery to the
receiving partition. The sequence numbers are one octet
long with a range from 0 to 255 and are incremented on
each successive frame. After 255, the sequence number is
wrapped around to 1. The sequence number 0 is reserved
for communicating resets. In this way the partition is unaware of the underlying network redundancy, and a simple interface can be built between the communications stack
and partitions that utilize the network service.
In the default mode, each frame is sent across both of
the networks and the redundancy is taken care at the receiving end-system. In order to simplify the algorithm at the
receiving end-system, redundant copies of a frame should
be sent within a maximum time difference of 0.5 ms. Upon
reception, an algorithm in the communications stack (below
IP layer) uses a “First Valid Wins” policy. This means that
the first frame to be received from either network with the
next valid sequence number is accepted and passed up the
stack to the receiving partition. When the second frame is
received with this sequence number, it is simply discarded.
As the flow of frames given in Figure 3 below indicates,
Redundancy Management (RM) is placed after the Integrity
Checking (IC).
Under fault-free network operation, the IC simply passes
the frames that it has received on to the RM, independently
for each network. If there are faults (based on sequence
number), the IC has the task of eliminating invalid frames,
and informs the network management accordingly. For each

The ARINC-664 [2] is a commercial standard for the
avionics communication architecture. The AFDX [3] is a
vendor specific implementation of this standard. It is based
on the 802.3 standard Ethernet with enhancements to ensure determinism and reliability. An overview of a switched
Ethernet avionics network along with testing challenges are
identified in [10]. While their work concentrates on hardware testing of various modules through simulation, our focus here, is to formally model and analyze the design under
different faults. Our model was developed using UPPAAL,
a freely available tool that allows modeling with a flavor
of timed automata, called the Timed Safety Automata [7].
The modeling language in UPPAAL builds on the timed
automata model, providing useful extensions like integer
variables, broadcast channels, urgent and committed locations, etc. The model-checker in UPPAAL allows specifying queries using a simplified version of CTL, where the
query language consists of path and state formula, but the
path formulae cannot be nested. A significant body of literature exists on modeling and verification of protocols in
UPPAAL(c.f., [6, 8, 12]).

3 AFDX and the Frame Management
The main elements of the AFDX network are endsystems, switches, and links. The function of the Endsystem (ES) is to provide services, which guarantee a secure and reliable data exchange to the partition software.
Each end-system has a direct, bidirectional connection to a
switch. There may be multiple such connections to be used
for redundant communication. The switched network ensures that the connection and bandwidth required to move
data from one end-system to another is available. Quality
of Service (QoS) provides a method for categorizing traffic
and for ensuring that particular categories of traffic will always flow across the network at the service level to which
they are entitled, regardless of competing demands. For the
aircraft network, each network transmission request must
be serviced regardless of the data type and a maximum network transit delay, called end-to-end latency(L), must be
guaranteed. A guaranteed service provides a firm, mathematically provable, upper bound on end-to-end latency.
The Virtual Link(VL) is the basis of the Ethernet protocol. Each VL defines an unidirectional connection from one
2
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the system waits till the end of the BAG to transit back to
the initial state. From the initial state, the system can nondeterministically progress to the Reset state that captures
the reset of the transmitting end-system. If there is a reset,
then we wait for time HR before sending frame 0, indicating a reset, on both the channels. This reflects the time the
transmitting system takes to go though an hardware reset.
In the model, a boolean variable rchk is set whenever the
system is reset. This will help us to trace the execution of a
reset and also ascertain whether the receiving system resets
in response to a transmitter reset.
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Figure 2. Network Redundancy Concept
network the IC tests each frame for a sequence number in
the interval: [P SN ⊕ 1, P SN ⊕ 2] where Previous Sequence Number (PSN) is the sequence number of the previous frame received (but not necessarily forwarded) on this
VL. The operator ⊕ takes the wrap-around of sequence
numbers into account. So, for example if P SN = 254,
then P SN ⊕ 1 = 255 and P SN ⊕ 2 = 1.
The function of the AFDX redundancy management is
merely to eliminate frames that are redundant copies of
frames that it has already passed on to the partition.The RM
assumes that the network is working properly and, in particular, the deterministic properties are verified. RM configuration is generally based on the SkewM ax parameter:
i.e. the maximum time between the reception of two redundant frames. This value depends on the network topology
(number of switches crossed by the frames) and should be
provided by the system integrator. The SkewM ax value
(expressed in ms) is given by configuration per VL.

c==BAG
tfr:=(tfr<255)?(tfr+1):1,rchk:=0

Init

tfr:=0,rchk:=1,c:=0

SentOne

SentTwo
msg_two!

c<1

c<=BAG

c>=HR
msg_one!
c:=0

Reset

Figure 3. Timed Automata Model of the Transmitting End-system

4.2

4 System Model

Network Channel

The network channel is responsible for transmitting
frames from the receiving end-system and deliver it to the
receiving end-system. The focus of our work here is to
model different kinds of network faults and view its impact
on the frame management. In this model, we consider two
kinds of network faults :

We model the AFDX frame management, introduced in
the previous section as a network of timed automata. The
timed automata model allows us to quantitatively capture
the temporal aspects of the frame management such as maximum latency, skew and the BAG. The model was developed using U PPAAL.In our model, we have three principals
: The transmitting end-system, the channel, and the receiving end system. We will restrict ourselves to the case of two
redundant channels. However, extending the reasoning for
more redundant channels is fairly straightforward.

4.1

msg_one!
c:=0

1. Transmission Related: Under this category, we consider errors such as bit-errors, dropped packets, etc.
We model these errors as being non-deterministic and
independent. In practice, however, it is commonly
assumed that the probability of error in consecutive
frames is close to zero. Nevertheless, assuming the
errors to be independent keeps the model simple while
retaining its implications in practice.

Transmitting End-system

The transmitting end-system sends the messages on the
redundant channels. The message (msg) is assumed to be
broken into frames (fr) that are then communicated across
the channels. The model for the transmitting system is given
in Figure 3. The initial state is Init from which the messages are sent on both the channels within 0.5ms of each
other. Since U PPAAL allows only integer constraints on
clock variables, in the model, we use c<1 to capture this
constraint.
The actual sending of the messages is captured via the
channels msg one and msg two. After the transmission,

2. Network Babble: The network can sometimes babble
i.e., deliver arbitrary frames to the receiver and we
model this fault in the network channel. Again, we
assume that the babbling is non-deterministic and independent of other faults.
Initially, the system is in the state Idle. Upon receiving the message msgr ( which could be either msg one
or msg two), it transits to the transmitting state. If the
transmission is successful, then, SendSuccessful state
is reached. The system can remain in this state for as long
3

msgr?
frq[ub]:=tfr,ub:=(ub<4)?(ub+1):0
rfr:=nfr, chk:=((nfr>prfr)&&(nfr-prfr<=2))||((nfr<prfr) && ( nfr-prfr+255<=2))?1:0
SendSuccessful
cn<=max_latency

Update

no_error?

Transmitting

cn:=0
ub!=lb tr!
nfr:=frq[lb],lb:=(lb<4)?(lb+1):0

msgd!
prfr:=nfr

error?
cn:=0

msgr?
nfr=tfr

Idle

SendFailed
cn<=max_latency
nfr:=rv1
msgd!

msgr?
frq[ub]:=tfr,ub:=(ub<4)?(ub+1):0

BabbleSend
Babble

chk:=3

msgr?

Figure 4. Timed Automata Model of the Channel
as max latency and then the frame is delivered to the receiving end-system by passing through the Update state.
The delivery of the frame is signaled by msgd. If the
transmission fails, then SendFailed state is reached from
which the system returns to the initial state. Network babbling is modeled in states Babble and BabbleSend during which the network delivers random numbered frames
(rv1) to the receiving end-system.
We also implement a message frame queue in frq. In
the model, we consider the maximum length of this queue to
be 5. This allows the network and the transmitter to be independent. Whenever the the transmitting end-system transmits, the frame is queued and subsequently transmitted by
the network.
A variable chk is introduced to keep track of frame being delivered. If a valid frame is being delivered, then, it
takes a value 1 else it is assigned 0. If the frame being delivered is a result of babbling, then chk is assigned 3.

4.3

t
BAG

Lmin

Figure 6. A system with two agents
and psnub are used to keep track of the interval bounds.
Upon receiving a 0, the system is reset via the state Reset.
We incorporate several variables to check for certain
cases of interest such as acceptance of a babbling frame,
resets, etc.:
1. chk: This variable is shared with the network channel
and is assigned 2 when it is discarded by the RM but
passes through the IC.
2. resetchk : This is a boolean variable that is set
whenever the receiving system resets.
3. babchk :A boolean variable that is set whenever a
babbling frame is accepted. Note that the babbling
frame is tracked by verifying if chk=3.

Receiving End-system

The receiving end-system implements the integrity
checking (IC) and redundancy management (RM). Frames
that are not in the interval [P SN ⊕ 1, P SN ⊕ 2] are discarded by the IC, except in the case when the frame number
is 0. Frames may also be discarded in the RM because of
the “first valid wins” policy. Both these policies are implemented in our model.
The automata for receiving end-system, given in Figure 5, is initially in the state NotRecd. If a valid packet
is received from the first channel, then it updates the previous sequence number (psn) by going through the state
RecdOne. A valid frame is similarly handled through the
state RecdTwo. Both these states are labeled as committed.
Therefore, time is not allowed to pass in this state and the
transition back to NotRecd is taken immediately. psnlb

4. valid : This variable is also a boolean that is set
whenever the frame is accepted by entering one of the
states RecdOne or RecdTwo.

5 Analysis and Results
The semantics of the frame management depend on the
relationship between various parameters such as, actual latency, the skew between reception of redundant frames, and
the time for hardware reset. Here, we consider two distinct
cases:
Let Lmax be the maximum latency of arrival of a frame,
Lmin the minimum latency, and SkewM ax, the time between delivery of redundant frames. Consider the scenario
4

RecdOne
(fr!=psnlb)&&(fr!=psnub)
recd_two?
chk:=(chk2==1) && (fr!=psn)?2:chk

babchk:=(chk1==3)?1:0
fr==0
recd_one?

resetchk:=0,psnlb:=(fr<255)?fr+1:1,psnub:=(fr+2>255)?fr-253:fr+2,psn:=fr,valid:=0

(fr==psnlb)||(fr==psnub)
recd_one?
babchk:=(chk1==3)?1:0,valid:=1

Reset
psnlb:=1,psnub:=2,resetchk:=1,rchk:=0,psn:=0

NotRecd

(fr==psnlb)||(fr==psnub)
recd_two?
babchk:=(chk2==3)?1:0,valid:=1

fr==0
recd_two?
babchk:=(chk2==3)?1:0

(fr!=psnlb)&&(fr!=psnub)
recd_one?
chk:=(chk1==1) && (fr!=psn)?2:chk
resetchk:=0,psnlb:=(fr<255)?fr+1:1,psnub:=(fr+2>255)?fr-253:fr+2,psn:=fr,valid:=0

RecdTwo

Figure 5. Timed Automata Model of the Receiving End-system
2. Case SkewM ax ≥ (Lmax + BAG − Lmin ):
For certain kind of messages, such as those with multimedia content, the skew may actually be longer than
Lmin + BAG − Lmax . In this case, it is possible that,
the redundant frames arrive after the next frame arrives
on the first channel. Therefore, apart from ensuring
that babbling frames are never accepted and no erroneous resets, we test whether a frame is ever dropped
when delivered to the receiver.

of frame arrivals as shown in Figure 6. Let us assume that
a frame was delivered at time t on the first channel. The
redundant frame on the other channel can arrive as late as
t+SkewM ax and the successive frame on the first channel
may arrive as early as Lmin in the next BAG. Therefore if
BAG − t + Lmin > SkewM ax, then, the redundant frame
will arrive before the successive frame on the first channel.
Since t can be as large as Lmax in the worst case, to require
that redundant frames arrive before the successive frame,
we should have BAG − Lmax + Lmin > SkewM ax. We
now analyze the model based on this condition.

When model-checked, a counterexample was generated for all the three cases. We present the counterexample that was generated when testing for the last
property. The counterexample for first two cases are
similar to those given above.

1. Case SkewM ax < (Lmax + BAG − Lmin ):
This situation may apply to many types of messages
such as those with real-time data. In this case, although the frames arrive in-order, we would want to
test the behavior under transmission faults, network
babble and reset messages.

• If a valid and non-redundant frame is delivered,
then it is not discarded This property was expressed using the CTL condition A[] chk!=2.
When the faster of the two networks delivers successive invalid and valid frames before the slower
network can deliver the first frame, the receiving
end-system accepts the second frame from the
faster network and considers the valid first frame
as invalid and discards it.
We note that although this scenario is mentioned
in the AFDX design document [3], it has not been
addressed there. Dropped frames could affect the
QoS and hence should be avoided. In the next
section, we show that a minor modification to the
original design can help avoid this problem and
thereby ensure good QoS.

(a) A babbling frame is never accepted : The variable babchk was used to verify this property. The desired property is the expressed
by the CTL condition E<> (rs1.babchk &&
rs1.valid). This property was satisfied in the
model, and the following diagnostic trace was
generated: If one of the network babbles such
that the babbling frame number lies in [P SN ⊕
1, P SN ⊕ 2], then this gets accepted and in this
process, the legitimate frame from the other network gets rejected even though it is delivered
successfully.
(b) A receiving end-system reset implies a transmitting system reset: This was expressed using the condition, A[] rs1.Reset imply
rchk. The following counterexample was generated in this case: If a network babbles a reset
frame number, then that results in the receiving
end-system erroneously reseting.

6 Improving the Frame Management Design
The frame management design could be modified to be
handle network babbling and also not disregard valid frames
that arrive late. We suggest two changes to the design that
will help us achieve these goals.
5
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time we enqueue an element, it can be timestamped and
dequeued either upon receipt of the redundant frame from
the other channel or after time SkewMax. If the redundant
frame fails to arrive, then, we would have to wait for the
successive frame to arrive on the channel, so that it can be
tested for babbling ( a wait of Lmax + BAG − Lmin). The
queue is also to be emptied after the frame 255 is received
to keep it from interfering with the priorities once the frame
number starts over from 1.
Compared to the modified design, where the additional
latency could be as high as Lmax + BAG − Lmin , the original design introduces, at worst, a delay of of SkewM ax
when the frame is dropped on the first channel. However,
despite higher latencies, the modified design may be preferred for implementation as it offers better data integrity
and QoS.
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Figure 7. Redundancy Management with a
Priority Queue

6.1

Integrating the IC and RM with a Priority Queue

The first suggestion for improving the frame management is the introduction of a integrity check with queuing
module instead of the distinct IC and RM modules in the
original design. The modified design is presented in Figure
7. Listing 1 describes the action taken when a frame fr
with frame number frn is delivered to the module. The
main idea is that, whenever a frame is delivered such that
it is valid for that particular channel, it is enqueued. If that
particular frame is already present in the queue, it is verified for consistency. If a channel delivers a frame with the
same frame number twice, it is treated as network babble
and the frame ignored. Since the previously delivered frame
from the same channel could also be due to the network babble, we should delete it from the queue to avoid accepting
frames that are not legitimate.
In the Listing 1, we assume that enqueue and
isPresent are functions that are implemented.
enqueue is assumed to take the message and the
frame number as input and enqueue it in the queue according to the priority. isPresent is assumed to check
whether a particular frame is already present in the queue
and return the frame if present else return null. The case
of resets i.e., frn=0 is treated in the next section. We also
assume that we have two counters, psn[ch],ch=1,2,
that keep a track of the previous sequence number of that
channel.
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:

6.2

Handling Resets

One of the problems with the AFDX frame management
is that it is vulnerable to babbling resets. The IC works as
long as frame numbers are greater than 0, but accepts the
frame 0 and resets. The problem is that, with just two channels and one reset message, we cannot achieve tolerance to
both network babble and transmission loss: If only one reset message is received at the end-system, it could either be
due to network babble on one channel or due to transmission loss on the other.
One strategy to achieve tolerance to babbling, is to increase the number of redundant channels. That way, a voting scheme [4] can be used to decide on resets. To achieve
tolerance to one channel babble, we would need at least
three channels. However, including more redundant channels adds a significant overhead and therefore not an attractive option for implementation.
An alternative to having more redundant channels, is to
send redundant messages on each of the channels. The idea
is that, instead of sending frame 0 once, we send two reset
messages (frame 0) on both the channels. The receiver resets only when it gets at least one 0 frame from either of
the channels. This is described in Listing 2. It can easily be
seen that this modification makes the design tolerant to babbling on one channel and one message loss due to transmission. The disadvantage here, when compared to adding an
extra channel, is the increased delay before the receiver reset. However, since there is no extra overhead, this scheme
may be preferred over adding an extra channel.
Analysis on the modified design: We modified the timed
automata models with the above suggestions and checked
for the desired properties. Only the reset property A[]
rs1.Reset imply rchk generated a counter example
when both the frames on one channel were dropped. Although this is a possibility, the probability of this happening

wait(f r)
if ((f rn > 0) ∧ (f rn ∈ [psn[ch] ⊕ 1, psn[ch] ⊕ 2])) then
if (isP resent(f rn) = null) then
enqueue(fr)
psn[ch] ← f rn
else if (isP resent(f rn) 6= f r) then
// Inconsistent frames
end if
else if (f rn = psn[ch]) then
// Channel ch babbling
end if

Listing 1: Handling frames with the priority queue
Dequeuing the frames: Messages in the queue can be
dequeued and handed over to the application at hand. Every
6

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:

7.1

resetCounter[1] ← 0
resetCounter[2] ← 0
wait(f r)
if (f rn = 0) then
resetCounter[ch] ← resetCounter[ch] + 1
end if
if (resetCounter[1] ≥ 1) ∧ (resetCounter[2] ≥ 1) then
// reset
end if

Testing AFDX Implementations

in practice are extremely small.

As future work, we propose to generate test suites based
on the UPPAAL model we have developed. Testing AFDX
implementations would involve injecting faults in the network as per the automata model and observing for changes
registered at the receiving end-system. The faults injected
in the network would then have to be controlled and the behavior observed for possibilities of different errors, including multiple instances of the same error and simultaneous
occurrence of distinct types of errors. Online testing based
on U PPAAL models have been developed [11] and we hope
to adapt it for generating tests for our models.

6.3
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We notice that there is a tradeoff between latency at the
receiver versus adding an extra channel: By increasing the
number of independent channels, we can reduce the latency
and by reducing the number of channels, we would have
to transmit multiple copies, and this results in increased latency. Therefore the exact design choice would have to depend on the application at hand. If the extra latency is acceptable, then we could do without an extra channel. However, many critical applications an extra channel would have
to be employed to achieve fault tolerance.

7 Conclusions and Future Work
The AFDX is an implementation of the commercial
standard for avionics communication architecture, called
ARINC-664. It has been developed for providing reliable
and deterministic delivery of frames in a switched Ethernet for avionics applications. To provide these guarantees,
frames are sent over redundant links that have a bounded
latency and bandwidth. The frame management is responsible for managing the redundancy and checking integrity
of frames before handing it to the application. The frame
management also aims to achieve tolerance to faults such as
transmission errors and network babbling. In this work, we
have developed a formal model of the AFDX frame management using a network of timed automata. From our
analysis, we have uncovered that the design is vulnerable
to babbling resets and dropping of frames. To address these
issues, we have proposed integrating the redundancy management and integrity checking with the help of a priority
queue, and duplication of reset message on each channel.
These modifications are relatively simple to incorporate into
the original design and help achieve tolerance to channel
babble and a better QoS.
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